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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court in BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore' substantially expanded the scope of
federal constitutional review of punitive damage awards by
finding the size of punitive damages awarded by the Alabama
court so large as to violate federal substantive due process; and
by attempting to create what the Court called "guideposts" for
judicial review to determine if the amount of a punitive damage
award violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. The BMW decision is troubling to state courts because
for the first time, the Supreme Court struck down a punitive
damage award because the size of the award violated
substantive due process. The BMW decision subjects state court
awards of punitive damages to federal constitutional scrutiny
but provides little guidance to help state courts determine just
what level of award will pass due process muster.2
Prior to BMW, relying on earlier Supreme Court decisions,
many state legislatures and appellate courts attempted to
develop criteria which must be considered by the jury when
awarding, and by state courts when reviewing, punitive damage
awards. No matter how well intended and comprehensive the
criteria, BMW places the state standards at risk of violating
federal substantive due process if they exclude, overemphasize,
de-emphasize, or improperly expand the "guideposts" which
1. 517 U.S. 559(1996).
2. Complicating the issue is the fractured nature of the BMW decision; both the
five member majority and three member concurring opinion (a majority of the majority)
emphasized different criteria for the evaluation of punitive damages and failed to
explain why the identical Alabama guidelines had been misapplied in BMW but properly
applied in the 1991 decision of Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
The two dissenting opinions chided the majority for their failure to provide any guidance
to state courts and for getting involved in an area of the law which should rightly belong
to the states.
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BMW found to be critical to the evaluation of punitive damage
awards. The trial judge involved in a case that may go to the
jury on punitive damages must be prepared to rule on the
admissibility of damage-related evidence, properly instruct the
jury regarding the matters it may consider when setting the
level of punitive damages, subsequently conduct a meaningful
review of the jury verdict and articulate the reasons why the
jury award is affirmed or modified. Counsel preparing for trial
and conducting settlement negotiations "in the shadow of the
law" must know what evidence should be discovered and will be
admitted at trial and then counsel must defend, or challenge, a
punitive damage award in the event the case presents a BMW
due process issue.3 Both the trial court and counsel need to know
what evidence is legally relevant to the amount of punitive
damages to be awarded, the appropriate weight to be given to
that evidence, and a general sense of when a punitive damage
award is simply too large given the circumstances of the case.
The debate over punitive damages continues to spark claims
that punitive damage awards are "out of control."4 Despite a
history of awarding punitive damages dating back over
hundreds of years,5 critics of punitive damages claim that not
only are juries incompetent 6 and biased,7 the confusing common
law of punitive damages leads to irrational and inconsistent jury
and appellate decisions. 8 These concerns have led the Supreme
3. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1998) (providing for a direct appeal to the United States
Supreme Court by application for a writ of certiorari). The United States Supreme Court
may vacate the state court decision and remand for further consideration in light of the
BMW opinion. See Apache Corp. v. Moore, 517 U.S. 1217 (1996) (removing) and Apache
Corp. v. Moore, 960 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. App. 1997) (considering further). See also District
of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983) (holding that federal
district courts do not have jurisdiction "over challenges to state-court decisions in
particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that
the state court's action was unconstitutional").
4. See John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive
Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139 (1986).
5. See Paul M. Sykes, Marking a Road to Nowhere? Supreme Court Sets Punitive
Damages Guideposts in BMW v. Gore, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1084 (1997) (noting Exodus 22:4,
requiring double restitution for the crime of theft); 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R.
REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 1-3 (3d ed. 1995) (noting the existence of punitive damages
in the Code of Hammurabi in 2000 B.C.).
6. See Lisa M. Sharkey, Comment, Judge or Jury: Who Should Assess Punitive
Damages?, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 1089, 1127-29 (1996).
7. See Alan Howard Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the
Seventh Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 CoLUM. L. REV. 142, 164-70
(1991).
8. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 475 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Court to periodically address procedural and substantive due
process aspects of the punitive damage question and state
legislatures to implement punitive damage reforms.
Despite the BMW decision, it has become clear that the
Supreme Court will not provide definitive rules to guide trial
courts in assessing and reviewing punitive damage awards.
Deserving punitive damage claims, demands for more punitive
damage reform, vaguely worded Supreme Court substantive due
process guideposts, and legitimate state interests in punishment
and deterrence of outrageous conduct combine to create a trial
replete with potential error which could cause an expensive and
justice-delaying retrial. Counsel and the trial judge armed with
a working knowledge of the issues likely to arise during a
punitive damage trial must develop a trial plan that addresses
problems prior to the time of their usual trial appearance. A
valuable secondary gain to the legal profession of careful
attention to integrating constitutional mandates with state
standards is the development of a body of state practice which
balances constitutional guarantees with the punitive damage
interests of the state.
The recent punitive damage reforms adopted by many
states attempt to limit punitive damages to their proper purpose
and help juries reach appropriate verdicts. These punitive
damage reform efforts generally address what have been called
the primary goals of punitive damage reform: complying with
Constitutional guarantees; maintaining effective deterrence and
punishment; promoting stability; reducing the chilling effect of
punitive damages on businesses' research, innovation, and
competitiveness; eliminating the windfall aspect of punitive
damages; and improving the administration of the punitive
damages system.9
This article provides a brief history of the development of
the constitutional punitive damage aspects, a "heads up" on the
due process issues that are likely to arise during the trial, and
an understanding of the duties imposed on the trial judge when
reviewing a punitive damage award. Section II surveys the
purpose of punitive damages and reviews the three primary
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court preceding BMW, decisions
which laid the framework for the procedural requirements of a
punitive damages trial. Section III examines in some detail the
9. See Development in the Law: The Civil Jury, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1408, 1536
(1997).
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BMW decision by the U. S. Supreme Court which elevated the
amount of a punitive damage award to a federal substantive due
process level; the reaction to BMW; and the reasoning of the
concurring opinion. Section IV discusses the due process aspects
of BMW, its "shadow" effect on settlement practices, and its
application in subsequent court decisions. Section V considers
state standards for punitive damage awards and the various
ways that state courts have reviewed such awards with respect
to state standards and BMW guideposts. Section VI advances
the due process reasons for expanding the jury instruction to
achieve "reasonable constraints" and considers the various
approaches which a trial court and appellate court may take as
they review a jury award of punitive damages. Section VII
examines the punitive damage procedure in Montana and
neighboring states. Section VIII offers suggestions for drafting
instructions and reviewing punitive damage awards and
recommends changes to Montana's current jury instruction and
trial court review procedure. Appendix A contains a summary of
the Green Oil/Haslip factors, BMW guideposts, and Model
Punitive Damage Act suggestions. Appendix B contains a
proposed Montana Jury Instruction for setting the amount of
punitive damages.
II. HISTORY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Public Policy Considerations
Punitive damages, commonly called "exemplary" damages,
are awarded to punish and deter extreme and outrageous
conduct. They are awarded in addition to the amount necessary
to compensate the injured party and stand in marked contrast to
compensatory damages, focused largely on the defendant's
conduct rather than the extent of injury to the plaintiff. The
traditional twin goals of punitive damages, punishment and
deterrence, have become enlarged to encompass a wide range of
public policy goals. The essential focus of punitive damages is
on deterring morally repugnant conduct by a method short of
criminal sanction, encouraging large corporations from taking
advantage of less powerful adversaries, serving a private
prosecutorial function by making claims of small financial value
worthy of litigation, rewarding the plaintiff for bringing the
defendant to justice, and providing a method for payment of
plaintiffs attorney fees without reduction of the compensatory
1999 371
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award. 10
Critics of punitive damages argue that the uncertainty of
punitive damage awards creates a negative climate for business
and increases the cost of production by over-estimating the
expected value of liability exposure. Businesses are unwilling to
take the risks necessary to develop potentially beneficial
products and unwilling to take unnecessary precautions.
Insurance to cover punitive damage claims is often unavailable
and, when available, extremely expensive. Settlement costs in
punitive damage claims are increased because of the ripple
effect of large awards, which encourage others to file suit.
Punitive damage awards constitute a windfall for plaintiffs."
Public perception of frequent and large punitive damage
awards has created a great debate over the propriety of punitive
damages. 12 Impassioned as the arguments become, the statistics
suggest that juries are not out of control when they award
punitive damages. In the 1992 Civil Justice Survey of State
Courts conducted by the Department of Justice and the National
Center for State Courts, only two percent of the 762,000 cases
resolved by trial, settlement, or some other method in the
nation's seventy-five largest counties were decided by juries.
When a jury did decide a case and the plaintiff won, there was
only a six percent chance that the jury would award punitive
damages. Half of the those awards were under $50,000.13
Regardless of the ongoing debate over the merits of punitive
damages, it is clear that juries will continue to award punitive
damages to punish and deter. As noted by the United States
Supreme Court -in 1851, the availability of punitive damages
"will not admit of argument."14
B. Basic Elements of a Punitive Damages Action
Punitive damages may be recovered in an ever-expanding
range of civil actions 15 but are generally not permitted in
10. See Sabrina C. Turner, The Shadow of BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore,
1998 WIS. L. REV. 427, 429-31.
11. See id. at 430-31.
12. See STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIEs AND THE POLITICS OF
REFORM 1-7 (1995).
13. See Richard C. Reuben, Plaintiffs Rarely Win Punitives, Study Says DOJ
Survey of State Civil Verdicts Praised for Depth, Criticized for Emphasis, 81 A.B.A.J. 26
(1995).
14. Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 363, 371 (1851).
15. See generally PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND BUSINESS TORTS: A PRACTITIONER'S
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contract actions or claims based on statutory causes of action.
Certain contract-based actions, particularly those involving a
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing arising from a
special relationship between the parties, will support a claim for
punitive damages. 16
Although punitive damages are not generally allowed in
negligence claims, an allegation of gross negligence will often
support a punitive damage claim. 17 Products liability actions are
a frequent source of punitive damage claims and many
important state decisions in this area have led to the
development of criteria for jury assessment of punitive
damages.18
When a tort claim is combined with a contract action, as in
tortious interference with a contract, punitive damages are
permitted. The plaintiff must generally show a specific
intention to harm and such tortious interference claims have
resulted in some of the largest punitive verdicts. 19 State law will
generally identify the type of actions that either permit, or
prohibit, a claim for punitive damages. 20
Punitive damages can be recovered only when the
defendant's conduct is accompanied by aggravating factors.
While there are many different formulations of the standard for
punitive damage liability, the primary principle is the
defendant's consciousness of wrongdoing or awareness of
conduct from which harm can reasonably be expected to flow. 2'
The courts often describe the standard of liability by the use of
various adjectives; such as, willful, wanton or malicious;
reckless, oppressive or fraudulent; or fraudulent, malicious,
grossly negligent, oppressive or with evil motives.22
The burden is upon the plaintiff seeking punitive damages
to prove that the defendant's conduct merits such an award.
The burden of proof is generally established by the law of the
HANDBOOK (Thomas J. Collin ed., 1998) [hereinafter PRACTITIONER'S HANDBOOK].
16. See Jackson Natl Life Ins. Co. v. Receconi, 827 P.2d 118 (N.M. 1992).
17. See generally SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 5, § 9.3 (A).
18. See id. at § 9.5(A).
19. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768, 809 (Tex. App. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 994 (1988).
20. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-220 (1997) (prohibiting punitive damages
arising from contract or breach of contract). However, the preceding limitation does not
prohibit recovery of punitive damages in a products liability action. See MONT. CODE
ANN. § 27-1-220(2) (1997).
21. See PRACTITIONER'S HANDBOOK, supra note 15, at 38.
22. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(1) (1997) (actual fraud or actual malice).
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jurisdiction and may be by a preponderance of the evidence, by
clear and convincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable doubt.23
As a general rule, punitive damages cannot be awarded in
the absence of compensatory damages. Although some states
require an award of actual damages, others allow punitive
damages when there is an award of nominal damages or a
showing of harm or injury even if the jury does not award actual
damages. 24
Many states have adopted the requirement that trials
involving punitive damages are subject to the rule of trial
bifurcation. This procedure divides a trial into two stages with
the fact-finder making determinations in both parts. The
variations include separate proceedings involving compensatory
damages and punitive damage issues 25  and/or separate
proceedings for determination of punitive liability and for
setting the amount of the award. 26 Bifurcation can be mandatory
in all punitive damage cases upon the request of either party.27
The purpose of bifurcation is to prevent jury confusion and
prejudice during the determination of liability. The defendant's
wealth or other bad acts, relevant considerations in the
determination of the amount of the punitive award, are not
proper matters for consideration during the jury's deliberations
on liability for compensatory damages. Further, since trials
involving punitive damage claims often involve different
standards of proof, such as preponderance of the evidence for the
compensatory claim versus clear and convincing for the punitive
claim, and different numbers of juror agreement, such as two
thirds for compensatory damages and unanimous for punitive
damages, 28 bifurcation helps to substantially reduce juror
23. See IDAHO CODE § 6-1604(1) (1998) (requiring proof by a preponderance of the
evidence); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(5) (1997) (requiring proof of clear and convincing
evidence); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-127(2) (1998) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt).
24. See Richard C. Tinney, Annotation, Sufficiency of Showing of Actual Damages
to Support Award of Punitive Damages-Modern Cases, 40 A.L.R.4TH 11, at § 4 (1986).
See also Weinberg v. Farmers State Bank of Worden, 231 Mont. 10, 752 P.2d 719, 732-33
(1988) (after recognizing that punitive damages may be awarded where plaintiff is
granted nominal damages, so may punitive damages be awarded where no monetary
value has been assigned to the actual damages suffered).
25. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7) (1997).
26. See NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42.005(3) (Michie 1997).
27. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7) (1997).
28. See id. § 27-1-221(6). However, at least one Montana district court judge has
ruled that Montana's unanimous verdict requirement for punitive damages is
unconstitutional. See Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion in Limine and Denying
374 Vol. 60
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confusion and consideration of improper evidence.
A nearly universal rule is that the fact-finder, whether
judge or jury, who determined the entitlement to punitive
damages, sets the amount of the award.29 Only Kansas and
Connecticut separate the finding by the jury as to whether
punitive damages should be awarded from the duty imposed on
the judge to set the amount of the award.30
C. Pre-BMW U.S. Supreme Court Punitive Damage Cases
A review of pre-BMW decisions by the U.S. Supreme Court
suggests that the Court may have seen BMW as an opportunity
to set the parameters for excessive punitive damage awards.
Until BMW, the Court's limit on punitive damages was a vague
standard of a "general concern of reasonableness."31 The primary
issue presented in BMW was the constitutional guarantee that
the government may not deprive citizens of their property
without due process of law. Despite brief mention in several
cases early in this century that due process protection might
extend to the assessment of excessive financial penalties,32 and
recent hints that the Court would entertain due process
challenges to large punitive damage awards,33 the Court was not
squarely faced with a due process claim until Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Haslip.34
In Haslip, the agent for Pacific Mutual accepted insurance
premium payments without forwarding them to the company.
Defendant's Motion in Limine Re Constitutional Right to Two-Thirds Jury Verdict on
Punitive Damages Claim, Finstad v. W.R. Grace & Co., Nos. DV-98-138, 139, 142 (19th
J. Dist. Ct. Apr. 30, 1999).
29. "Liability for punitive damages must be determined by the trier of fact,
whether judge or jury. An award of punitive damages must be unanimous as to liability
and amount." MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(6) (1997).
30. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(b) (1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-240b (1999).
31. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 458 (1993) (quoting
Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)).
32. See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Seegers, 207 U.S. 73, 77 (1907); Waters-Pierce Oil
Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 111 (1909).
33. See Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257
(1989). The Court did not address the claim of excessiveness under the Fourteenth
Amendment because it was not raised in the lower court. See id. at 258. However,
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, made it very clear when he stated:
I join the Court's opinion on the understanding that it leaves the door open for
a holding that the Due Process Clause constrains the imposition of punitive
damages in civil cases brought by private parties ....
Id. at 280.
34. 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
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The agent also failed to forward notices of policy cancellation to
the policyholder. The U.S. Supreme Court approved punitive
damages of $840,000 and compensatory damages of $200,000
and cited with approval Alabama's common-law approach for
assessing punitive damages. Alabama's system provided that
the jury was to be instructed to consider both the seriousness of
the defendant's act and the need to deter similar wrongful
conduct. The Alabama trial court and appellate court then
reviewed the award to ensure its reasonableness. The Court
held that due process was provided if the standards applied by
the state trial and appellate court impose a "sufficiently definite
and meaningful constraint" on a jury's discretion in awarding
punitive damages. These standards must ensure that any
award does not exceed an amount that will accomplish the goals
of punishment and deterrence.
After finding that the procedure used to assess and review
the punitive damage award afforded Pacific Mutual an adequate
safeguard of their due process rights, the Court noted that the
punitive damage award of four times the amount of the
compensatory damages was "close to the line" of constitutional
impropriety. The use of this language by the Court led many
commentators to conclude that the Court had finally set a due
process limit for punitive damages of four to five times the
actual damages as the point at which to begin heightened due
process scrutiny. Some courts considered Haslip as authority to
expand appellate review of punitive damage awards while
others considered that the only Haslip requirement was that the
punitive damage award be reasonable and rational.35
Of particular interest in Haslip was the Court's application
of the factors first approved by the Alabama Supreme Court in
Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby.36 The Haslip decision required the
objective application of the Green Oil factors so as to create a
"defmite and meaningful constraint on the discretion of the fact
finders in awarding punitive damages."37 The Green Oil/Haslip
factors require consideration of the following criteria:
(1) Whether there is a reasonable relationship
between the punitive damages award and
the harm likely to result from the
35. See Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1993).
36. 539 So.2d 218, 223-24 (Ala. 1989).
37. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 22.
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defendant's conduct as well as the harm
that actually has occurred;
(2) The degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct, the duration of that
conduct, the defendant's awareness, any
concealment, and the existence and
frequency of similar past conduct;
(3) The profitability to the defendant of the
wrongful conduct and the desirability of
removing that profit and having the
defendant also sustain a loss;
(4) The "financial position" of the defendant;
(5) All the cost of litigation;
(6) The imposition of criminal sanctions on the
defendant for its conduct, these to be taken
in mitigation; and
(7) The existence of other civil awards against
the defendant for the same conduct, these
also to be taken in mitigation.38
Two terms after Haslip, the Court decided TXO Production
Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.39 and upheld a punitive
damage award of $10 million and a $19,000 actual damage
award for slander of title. TXO had intentionally created a cloud
on the title of property owned by Alliance in order to reduce its
royalty payments and increase its oil and gas rights. The Court
held that in light of both TXO's reprehensible conduct and the
large potential loss to Alliance Resources Corporation, the
punitive damage award was not so "grossly excessive" as to be
beyond the power of the state to allow.40 The fact that the
award was upheld by the trial judge and the appellate court
gave rise to a strong presumption of validity, provided that fair
procedures were followed. Retreating to the language of Haslip,
the Court refused to "draw a mathematical bright line" while
38. Id. at 21-22.
39. 509 U.S. 443 (1993).
40. Id. at 462.
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maintaining "that [a] general concern of reasonableness...
properly enter[s] into the constitutional calculus."41
Clearly concerned about the lack of clear guidance to courts
regarding the standards for assessing punitive damages, Justice
O'Connor dissented, noting that "[dieprived of any fixed
landmarks and guideposts, any of us can be distracted, played
on, and befuddled to the point where our best guess is far from
reliable."42  Foreshadowing the multiple concurring and
dissenting opinions soon to appear in BMW, Justice Kennedy did
not agree with the plurality's discussion of the substantive
requirement of due process in terms of whether an award was
grossly excessive. Rather, he believed that the focus should be
on the reasons for the punitive damage award. Because the jury
in TXO based the punitive damages on TXO's malice, Justice
Kennedy concurred in the judgment but with a "certain degree
of disquiet in affirming [the] award."43 Because of the wide
range of concurring and dissenting opinions4 in TXO, the Court
did not adopt a true constitutional due process standard for
assessing punitive damages. However, TXO did demonstrate
the Court's agreement on the basic theory that due process
places some substantive limit on punitive damage awards.
Seeking to further refine the Haslip procedural
requirements, the Court in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg45 struck
down Oregon's method of assessing punitive damages because it
failed to include post-trial judicial review. The Court, noting
that the problem was not with the character of the standard for
identifying unconstitutional and excessive awards, but with the
procedures that were necessary to ensure that punitive damages
are not imposed in an arbitrary manner,46 required judicial
review as an essential element of due process. Calm and
reflective judicial review provides the restraint needed because
"jury instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion in
choosing amounts, and the presentation of evidence of a
defendant's net worth creates the potential that juries will use
their verdicts to express biases against big businesses,
41. Id. at 458 (quoting Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18 (1991)).
42. Id. at 475.
43. Id. at 443.
44. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (three
joining Justice Stevens' plurality opinion, three joining Justice O'Connor's dissent, and
Justice Kennedy concurring in part).
45. 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
46. See id. at 420.
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particularly those without strong local presence."47
Just prior to BMW, the attitude of the U.S. Supreme Court
toward large punitive damage awards was mixed, but indicated
grave concern about excessive awards. Haslip provided
procedural limitations on the assessment of punitive damages.
The Court expressly approved Alabama's common law procedure
but approval is not the same as fulfilling a due process
requirement. In Haslip, the Court seemed to require that juries
exercise their discretion within "reasonable constraints"48 and
that the award not entirely lack "objective criteria."49 Honda
reemphasized the need for judicial review, a requirement
clearly mandated by Haslip. TXO was the most valuable of the
pre-BMW cases because it signaled the size of a punitive damage
award as potentially violating substantive due process.
III. BMW OF NORTH AMERICA, INC. V. GORE
A. Majority Guideposts
In BMW, a five to four decision, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed a punitive damage award of $2 million that the
Alabama Supreme Court had approved. The Alabama Supreme
Court had reduced the original jury award from $4 million to $2
million.50 The punitive damages were assessed against the
automaker, BMW of North America, Inc., because BMW failed to
disclose that it had repainted Gore's car prior to sale. The jury
also awarded $4,000 in compensatory damages. 51 The bases for
the Court's reversal of the punitive damage award were largely
grounded on due process considerations.
Much of the academic commentary that followed the BMW
decision expressed concern over the failure of the decision to
provide guidance to either state courts or legislatures. 52 The lack
47. Id. at 432.
48. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 20 (1991).
49. Id. at 23.
50. 646 So. 2d 619 (1994).
51. See id. at 621-22.
52. See generally Michael Andrews, Comment, Constitutional Law-Punitive
Damages: The U.S. Supreme Court Uses the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to Strike Down a Two Million Dollar Punitive Damages Award BMW of
North America v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996), 73 N.D. L. REV. 299 (1997); Rob S.
Register, Note, BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore: The Supreme Court Rejects a
Punitive Damage Award on Due Process Grounds, 48 MERCER L. REV. 1273 (1997);
Thomas R. Calcagni, Note, Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendment-Due Process
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of clear criteria for evaluating the appropriate level of punitive
damages was heightened by the sharp division within the
Court.53 While the five member majority grounded their decision
on "substantive due process," the concurring opinion (a majority
within a majority) used a procedural approach that emphasized
factors that would limit the amount of punitive damages. The
four dissenting justices remained convinced that the
Constitution imposes no substantive limits on the size of
punitive awards and suggested that the Court should leave this
area of the law to the separate states.
The Court began by commending the Alabama Supreme
Court for reducing the punitive damage award to $2 million
because the jury had improperly taken into account the
defendant's actions in other states as a punitive damage
multiplier. The majority held the punitive damage award to be
"grossly excessive" under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and remanded the matter back to the
Alabama Supreme Court for further consideration. 54
The majority opinion in BMW held that a state must give
fair notice to persons that certain conduct will subject them to
punishment and the degree of severity of the sanction. In
deciding that fair notice had not been given and the punitive
damage award was grossly excessive, the Court framed its
analysis in terms of notice to the defendant, a concept generally
associated with procedural due process. With notice as the
primary consideration, the Court identified three "guideposts" to
determine whether notice had been effected: (1) the degree of
reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (2) the ratio between
the actual and potential harm and the punitive damages award;
Clause Requires That a State Provide Fair Notice of the Magnitude of a Punitive
Damages Award Assessed Against a Tortfeasor-BMW of N. Am. Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct.
1589 (1996), 27 SETON HAu L. REV. 708 (1997); The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-
Leading Case, Civil Forfeiture-Innocent Owner Defense, 110 HARV. L. REV. 135, 145,
151, 152 (1996); and Paul M. Sykes, Note, Marking a Road to Nowhere? Supreme Court
Sets Punitive Damages Guideposts in BMW v. Gore, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1084 (1997).
53. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (the five member
majority opinion was followed by a three member concurrence, a two member dissent,
and another two member dissent).
54. Under the Commerce Clause aspect of BMW, the Court held that a single state
cannot impose that state's automobile sales disclosure requirements on other states by
allowing juries to award damages in lawsuits brought in that state based on out-of-state
actions of the defendant. The Court noted with approval that the Alabama Supreme
Court had properly removed out-of-state considerations when they discounted the
original award of $4 million to $2 million. The Alabama Supreme Court held that the
jury had incorrectly based its award upon a multiplication of $4,000 (the compensatory
award) times 1000 (the number of refinished vehicles sold in the United States).
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and (3) sanctions for similar misconduct. The guideposts will
now form the basis for determining whether a jury award of
punitive damages is excessive. Although the guideposts are
couched in general terms, the Court expanded -on how they are
to be viewed in reviewing punitive damage awards.
Guidepost I: Degree of reprehensibility. The Court said that
the degree of reprehensibility is the most important indicator of
the reasonableness of punitive damages. The idea that the
punishment should fit the crime is a deeply rooted principle of
common law jurisprudence and reflects the universally accepted
view that some wrongs are more blameworthy than others. The
Court then proceeded to describe a hierarchy of reprehensible
conduct:
(1) Nonviolent crimes are less serious than
crimes marked by violence or the threat of
violence,
(2) Intentional trickery and deceit are more
reprehensible than negligence,
(3) Economic harm is less reprehensible than
physical harm,
(4) Repeated acts of prohibited conduct while
knowing or suspecting that it was unlawful
are more reprehensible than one instance
of malfeasance, and
(5) The omission of a material fact is less
reprehensible than deliberately making a
false statement. This is particularly true
when there is a good-faith basis for
believing that no duty to disclose exists.55
Guidepost II: Ratio of punitive damage award to
compensatory award. The Court reiterated that exemplary
damages must bear a "reasonable relationship" to compensatory
damages, but a constitutional line cannot be marked by a simple
mathematical formula. The size of the award can be one
indication that the punitive damage award resulted from bias,
55. BMW, 517 U.S. at 575-80.
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passion or prejudice. However, it is not the sole nor the most
important sign. The Court noted that the punitive damage
award should consider not only the harm actually done, but the
harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct. The size,
small or large, of the compensatory damages could support large
punitive damages; the punitive damage award is entirely
dependent on the facts of the case. This point was aptly made
when the Oregon Supreme Court said:
In BMW, the United States Supreme Court stated that, in some
circumstances, low compensatory damages might support a higher
ratio of punitive damages than would high compensatory
damages, presumably on the ground that a high compensatory
damage award would have a significant deterrent effect, making a
high punitive damage award less necessary to deter misconduct.
We conclude, however, that, in other cases, high compensatory
damages may themselves be evidence of the egregiousness of the
defendant's conduct and might, therefore, support a high ratio as
well. 5
6
The BMW Court further noted that a higher ratio may be
justified in cases where the injury is hard to detect or the
monetary value of non-economic harm might have been difficult
to determine. In concluding its consideration of the ratio aspect
of the punitive award, the Court reiterated its rejection of a
categorical approach and reaffirmed its statement in Haslip
that:
We need not, and indeed we cannot, draw a mathematical bright
line between the constitutionally acceptable and the
constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case. 57
Guidepost III: Sanctions for comparable misconduct.
Comparing the punitive damages award and the civil or criminal
penalties that could be imposed for comparable misconduct
provides a third indicator of excessiveness. The BMW Court
stated that a reviewing court should accord substantial
deference to legislative judgments concerning appropriate
sanctions for the conduct at issue.58 Although this guidepost
was not adopted by the Court on the basis of historical
acceptance and use, it does provide guidance when the punitive
damage award is "substantially greater than the statutory fines
56. Axen v. American Home Prods. Corp., 974 P.2d 224, 243 n.24 (Or. Ct. App.
1999).
57. BMW, 517 U.S. at 582-83.
58. See id. at 583.
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available."
In BMW, the Court found that the first guidepost (degree of
reprehensibility) indicated that BMW's infliction of harm was
purely economic in effect and no particular malicious intent was
involved. The second guidepost (ratio between harm and
punitive damage awards) suggested that a ratio of five hundred
times the compensatory award was clearly outside any
acceptable range. The third guidepost (criminal and civil
sanctions) focused on Alabama's $2,000 fine for similar action
and noted the fine was substantially smaller than the $2 million
punitive damage award. Further, the lack of notice of any state
law that the punishment would be so large dispelled any claim
that BMW was an intentional recidivist with full knowledge of
the size of potential punitive damage awards.
B. Commentary & Dissenting Opinions
Most comments following BMW have pointed out that the
three guideposts-reprehensibility, ratio, and similar sanctions--
provide little guidance to state courts in evaluating punitive
damages.
The test falls short of providing a workable, progressive standard
that may be readily adopted and applied by the lower courts....
[Tihe application of the standard will consume tremendous
judicial resources at both the trial and appellate levels. 59
[Tihe Court's analysis in [BMW] provides little guidance to either
legislatures or lower courts regarding the contours of the
constitutional limitations on excessive punitive damage
awards.... Unfortunately, [BMW] does not complement the
earlier line of cases; in fact, [BMW] obfuscates issues that the
Court had seemingly settled previously.... [BMW's] three
"guideposts" provide little guidance for future due process review;
as a result, such review will be almost entirely subjective. 60
The BMW Court accomplished little headway on the road to
clarifying the standard by which courts may measure the
constitutionality of a punitive damages award .... The result is
uncertainty for future litigants, whose success hinges on the
essentially subjective assessments of the reviewing court.... If
there are clearly defined guidelines on the awarding of punitive
damages, the awards of lower courts would more likely be
sustained and needless litigation over the award amounts would
be reduced... while the Court's decision in BMW appears to
59. Sykes, supra note 5, at 1107, 1114.
60. Civil Forfeiture-Innocent Owner Defense, supra note 52, at 145, 151, 152.
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mandate a more orderly system for assessing punitive awards, it
falls short of establishing such a system itself.61
A definitive test remains obscure. Lower courts must choose from
these conflicting standards in deciding how to objectively evaluate
a punitive award for excessiveness. 62
BMW may seriously undermine state policies regarding the
punitive awards process... Constitutional review of punitive
damages could also mean that an award that complies with a state
statutory maximum may still violate substantive due process.63
The dissenting opinions in BMW undoubtedly increased the
level of concern with their biting criticism of the majority's
inability to set definitive criteria for assessing punitive damage
awards. Although not a commentary in the usual sense, Justice
Scalia's dissent in BMW stated that the Court's three guideposts
"mark a road to nowhere [and] provide no real guidance at all."64
Justice Scalia, in his usual direct manner, went on to state that
the Court's framework "does nothing at all except confer an
artificial air of doctrinal analysis upon its essentially ad hoc
determination that this particular award of punitive damages
was not fair."65 Similarly, Justice Ginsburg's dissent noted that
"[Tloo big is, in the end, the amount at which five Members of
the Court bridle."66
C. Concurring Opinion
The uncertainty over exactly how objective standards for the
assessment of punitive damages may be drawn from the three
guideposts of BMW gives renewed importance to the
presumption of validity of the award that arises when fair
procedures are followed. In fact, the entire point of the
concurring opinion in BMW was to explain why the presumption
of validity when using the Green Oil/Haslip factors did not
apply in BMW. The extraordinary length to which the
concurring opinion goes to explain why the BMW punitive
damage award was not entitled to the presumption of validity
(because the Alabama courts had interpreted the Green
61. Calcagni, supra nQte 52, at 731-32.
62. Register, supra note 52, at 1280.
63. Andrews, supra note 52 at 319.
64. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 517 U.S. 559, 587 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
65. See id. at 586-87 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
66. See id. at 592 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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Oil /Haslip factors in a way that "belied their purpose") serves to
reinforce the importance of following fair procedures for the
assessment and review of punitive damages. Inherent in this
emphasis is the reaffirmation of the Haslip and Honda
principles regarding the importance of following fair procedures
for the assessment and review of punitive damages.67 Adherence
to fair procedures, as those procedures are outlined in the BMW
concurring opinion, would serve to keep the original award
within reasonable limits, provide valuable criteria for a
reviewing court, and enable the successful plaintiff to receive the
substantial benefit of the presumption of validity when the
punitive damage award is under federal due process scrutiny.68
The degree to which the concurring opinion in BMW focuses on
the importance of following fair procedures seems to suggest
their discomfort with reviewing courts setting arbitrary levels
that define excessive punitive damage awards.
It is against this background of seemingly arbitrary
guideposts and sharp criticism that the concurring justices felt
compelled to address their concern over the need to require the
application of law, rather than a decisionmaker's caprice. The
justices felt that the application of law was necessary to give the
requisite notice that a person's actions may be subject to
punishment and to assure the uniform treatment of similarly
situated persons.
Justice Breyer begins the concurring opinion by explaining
that if "fair procedures are followed, a judgment that is a
product of that process is entitled to a strong presumption of
validity." The Court had also held in Haslip that procedures
similar to those followed by the Alabama courts in BMW were
not, by themselves, fundamentally unfair. However, in the
present case, the presumption of validity was overcome by the
manner in which "the Alabama courts interpreted those
standards."69
Justice Breyer emphasized the importance of legal
standards that provide "reasonable constraints" within which
"discretion is exercised" that assure "meaningful and adequate
review by the trial court whenever a jury has fixed the punitive
damages."70 The concurring opinion held that Alabama's legal
67. See id. at 587-88.
68. See id. at 590-92.
69. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 592 (1996) (Breyer, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 587.
1999 385
19
Harkin: BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1999
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
process failed to provide the necessary constraint on the jury
and the courts in five areas. First, the Alabama statute allowing
for punitive damages gave no guidance regarding the size of the
punitive damages appropriate for different types of conduct.
Second, the Alabama Supreme Court applied the Green
Oil IHaslip factors in a way that imposed little actual constraint.
Third, the Alabama courts made no use of an alternative
standard or theory for the award, such as some economic
justification, that would provide the constraining legal force that
might otherwise be absent due to Alabama's broad punitive
damage statute or ineffective application of the Green
Oil/Haslip factors. Fourth, the award did not conform to any
community understanding or historic practice that would
provide background standards that constrained arbitrary
behavior and excessive awards. Fifth, no legislative enactment
classified or quantitatively limited punitive damage awards that
would constrain otherwise unbounded discretion.
Justice Breyer ultimately concluded that the system of
standards did not significantly constrain the jury and the
Court's discretion. In light of the state's legitimate punitive
damage objectives, the defective system of standards combined
with the grossly excessive amount of the award overcame the
strong presumption of validity generally accorded such
decisions.
IV. ASSESSING BMW'S IMPACT
A. Due Process
It has been argued that the primary difficulty with BMW is
the Court's attempt to apply substantive due process to what is
essentially a subjective process of awarding punitive damages.71
Justice Scalia clearly recognized this concern in his dissent,
when he noted the great difficulty of using the Due Process
Clause to measure the "fairness" of a punitive damage award.
There is general agreement among the legal community
that the realities of law require appellate courts to give great
deference to findings of fact by juries. Given that different
conclusions will be drawn from similar fact situations,72 the Due
71. See Jim Davis, Note, BMW v. Gore: Why the States (Not the U.S. Supreme
Court) Should Review Substantive Due Process Challenges to Large Punitive Damage
Awards, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 395 (1998).
72. See id. (citing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, DECIDING
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Process Clause can only require state courts to conduct
meaningful review; there cannot be a federal guarantee that all
punitive damage awards will be reasonable and fair to everyone.
Every case presents a unique fact situation and even similar
cases have subtle differences that the fact-finder is most
qualified to consider and weigh when assessing a punitive
damage award. Fact-specific punitive damage awards are not
readily susceptible to a formula-based standard.73 Likewise, it is
nearly impossible to set a "bright line" limit on the ratio of
punitive to compensatory awards. The considerable confusion
resulting from the ratio of 4 to 1 in Haslip being "close to the
line," but the ratio of 526 to 1 in TXO being constitutional, laid
the groundwork for the Court's struggle to define guideposts in
BMW. It seems apparent that there is considerable merit to the
suggestion that tort law is an area traditionally and rightly left
to the states;74 what federal substantive law can and should do
is focus on procedural due process.
In Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, the Court emphasized the
integrity of the judicial review process as a powerful safeguard
that protects against excessive punitive damage awards. In the
earlier Haslip decision, the Court clearly engaged in a
procedural inquiry while the Court in TXO was careful to
distinguish between the procedural and substantive
challenges. 75 The difficulty presented by BMW is that the Court
must be seen to have made a substantive due process decision.
To view the decision otherwise would overrule the clear
endorsement of Alabama's procedures in Haslip. To further blur
the distinction between substantive and procedural due process,
the BMW Court framed its decision in terms of notice to the
defendant, a procedural concept. The Court then set forth three
substantive guideposts that look at the amount awarded.
Although the BMW Court left intact the Green Oil /Haslip
APPEALS 24 (1960); Ellen E. Sward, Appellate Review of Judicial Fact-Finding, 40 U.
KAN L. REv. 1, 14 n.50 (1991)).
73. See Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability:
Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IOWA L. REv. 1, 12 (1992).
74. See Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 279
(1989) (stating that creating a federal common-law formula to determine when a
punitive damage award is excessive would require the Court "to ignore the distinction
between the state-law and federal-law issues."). The Court declined the invitation to
infringe upon state law by creating such a federal common-law standard.
75. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (plurality
opinion) (making a substantive due process determination in Parts II and III and
dismissing TXO's procedural arguments in Part IV).
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standards for use by the Alabama Supreme Court upon remand,
to be used when reconsidering the BMW punitive damage
award, there was now a substantive constitutional requirement
on lower courts to actually exercise these processes properly.
What may be gleaned from BMW is the need for lower courts to
be aware that federal appellate review will not tolerate mere lip
service to substantive standards during review by the trial and
appellate courts. Justice O'Connor, concerned that just such lip
service had occurred in TXO, quoted from the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals:
We understand as well as the next court how to... articulate the
correct legal principle, and then perversely fit into that principle a
set of facts to which the principle obviously does not apply. [All
judges] know how to mouth the correct legal rules with ironic
solemnity while avoiding those rules' logical consequences. 76
The burden that BMW has placed on trial judges is great-
judges must clearly articulate what standards to use to assess
and review punitive damage awards and truly apply those
standards in a manner that does not belie their purpose.
B. BMW's "Shadow" on Settlement Practices
Approximately 97% of all cases settle out of court,77 which
necessitates consideration of the effect of the BMW decision on
the settlement process. Much of the academic debate concerns
the "shadow effect"7 8 of BMW on settlement practices.79
Defendants are concerned that cases will be difficult to resolve
because the unpredictability of punitive damage awards will not
let cases settle at their true value.8 0 One of the major benefits
that is hoped will result from BMW is the removal of the
"jackpot" mentality surrounding punitive damage awards and
76. Id. at 500 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc.,
413 S.E.2d 897, 907 (W. Va. 1991)).
77. See Thomas Koenig, The Shadow Effect of Punitive Damages on Settlements,
1998 WIs. L. REV. 169, 209.
78. This term is commonly used to acknowledge that the parties are negotiating in
the "shadow" of the legal system. Verdict reports are used to assist negotiating parties
calculate expected low and high limits of judgment exposure.
79. See Koenig, supra note 77, at 180. Lawsuits represent only a small portion of
total liability claims, however. Only 2 percent of such claims are settled by verdict and
only one-third of claims become lawsuits. Nevertheless, lawsuit verdicts are important
because they influence the damage amount sought by plaintiffs and the size of out-of-
court settlements. See Ruth Gastel, The Liability System, INS. INFO. INST. REP. 1 (1998).
80. See Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV.
1093, 1137 (1996).
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the corresponding return of a level of predictability to the
settlement process. By requiring a due process standard that
prohibits "grossly excessive" punitive damage awards,
negotiators will be able to enter into the settlement process with
the knowledge that punitive damages may be awarded. Those
damages may be large, but they will not be "grossly excessive."8'
Counsel attempting to place a high and low limit on punitive
damage exposure must be aware of what evidence will be
presented to the jury, what instructions will be given to the jury,
and what factors the trial and appellate courts will consider
when reviewing the jury award. Counsel should also be aware,
when factoring actual jury awards of punitive damages into
their settlement offers, of the jurisdiction and time of the award.
Awards that pre-date BMW, or were not subject to BMW
guidepost scrutiny by a reviewing court, are substantially
diminished as indicators of what can be considered substantially
reasonable.
C. BMW in the Courts
Within a year after the BMW decision, its impact was felt
throughout the United States, albeit not in Alabama to any
significant degree.82  The most significant impact is the
divergence between state and federal courts' applications of the
BMW guideposts. Federal courts are more likely than state
courts to reduce a punitive damage award.8 3 Federal courts
seem to draw a constitutional line at a punitive to actual
damage ratio of 5 to 1 while state courts allow awards as high as
81. See Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490 n.31 (7th Cir. 1997)
(noting that with respect to punitive damages, the "judicial pendulum may be swinging
back toward a more cautious approach. .. ).
82. The results of the BMW decision in Alabama have been minimal; Alabama is
often referred to as "a tort hell." Richard Thornburgh, Want to Win a Big Suit? Go to
Alabama, USA TODAY, June 27, 1996, at 13A. From 1990 to 1994 juries in Alabama
awarded punitive damages nearly 10 times more often than the average jury in the U.S.
Jacqueline Bueno, Punitive-Damage System Needs Fixing-But How?, WALL ST. J., Oct.
18, 1995, at S1. Between 1987 and 1993, punitive damage awards in Alabama totaled
over $101 million while such awards in neighboring states of Georgia, Tennessee, and
Mississippi were slightly over $7 million, $5 million, and $3 million respectively. It is
not surprising that Wal-Mart was recently ordered by an Alabama jury to pay $3 million
in punitive damages for the false arrest of a suspected shoplifter. See ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Feb. 17, 1999.
83. See Samuel A. Thumma, In the Year Since the High Court's Landmark
Decision in 'BMW,' Federal Courts Have Reduced Punitive Damages Awards More
Frequently Than Have State Courts, NAVL L.J., June 30, 1997.
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30 to 1.84 The Tenth Circuit interpreted BMW to impose a
maximum ratio of 10 to 1 for economic injury cases where the
damage is significant and easily detected.8 5 The South Dakota
Supreme Court has upheld a punitive damage award ratio of 30
to 1 after applying South Dakota's five-part test and additional
considerations as required by BMW.8 6 The varied interpretations
of BMW that have occurred since the BMW decision suggest that
Scalia's dissenting concern-the three guideposts "provide no
real guidance at all"-was indeed prophetic.
V. STATE STANDARDS AND APPELLATE REVIEW PROCEDURE
Separate and apart from the BMW guideposts, most states
have their own standards for assessing punitive damages. State
standards may be developed from case law8 7 or specifically
spelled out by statute.88 In some jurisdictions, the court may
take into account the size of awards in similar cases8 9 but this is
a perplexing issue when the jury is not allowed to consider such
awards when the jury sets the level of punitive damages.
Although many state standards are nearly identical to the
BMW guideposts, these state standards may be subsumed into
the BMW criteria.90 Thus, when liability is based on state law
judges must assess and review a punitive damage award under
84. See id.
85. See Continental Trend Resources, Inc. v. OXY USA Inc., 101 F.3d 634, 639
(10th Cir. 1996).
86. See Schaffer v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 552 N.W.2d 801 (S.D. 1996).
87. See Ford Motor Co. v. Sperau, 708 So.2d. 111 (Ala. 1997). The Alabama
Supreme Court noted that the first two guideposts of BMW were already encompassed
within state factors, developed earlier by Alabama case law.
88. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(b) (1996), specifying that a court may
consider the following factors in determining whether the amount of punitive damages
awarded is reasonable:
(1) The likelihood at the time of the alleged misconduct that serious harm would
arise from the defendant's misconduct;
(2) The degree of the defendant's awareness of that likelihood;
(3) The profitability of the defendant's misconduct;
(4) The duration of the misconduct and any intentional concealment of it;
(5) The attitude and conduct of the defendant upon discovery of the misconduct;
(6) The financial condition of the defendant; and
(7) The total deterrent effect of other damages and punishment imposed upon the
defendant as a result of the misconduct.
89. See Morgan v. Woessner, 997 F.2d 1244 (9th Cir. 1993).
90. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923, 934
(M.D.N.C. 1997) ("[T]he North Carolina considerations [regarding whether a punitive
award is excessive] as well as a majority of the South Carolina factors are included in the
three BMW guideposts.").
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both the BMW and state standards. 91 While some courts have
developed a unitary analysis,92 most courts conduct a two-step
analysis, separately considering the award under state
standards and federal constitutional requirements. 93  The
separate analyses are preferable because even though a punitive
damage award may meet the BMW guideposts, it may still
violate state standards, and vice versa. 94
VI. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENTS
Haslip has been interpreted as establishing three due
process requirements to protect the defendant:
1. At trial, the jury must have adequate guidance by
instructions, so that its award is reasonable, and not a product
of "unlimited jury discretion."
2. The state must establish post-trial procedures for trial court
review of punitive damage awards to ensure "meaningful and
adequate review by the trial court."
3. The state must establish post-trial appellate review
procedures... [to make] "certain that the punitive damages
are reasonable in their amount and rational in light of their
purpose to punish what has occurred and to deter its
repetition."95
A. Jury Instructions
Jurors often receive only general instruction regarding the
factors to consider when assessing the amount of punitive
damage awards. Courts frequently instruct the jury to fix the
punitive damage award at a level that will punish and deter,
after consideration of the defendant's conduct, the nature and
extent of the plaintiffs injury, and the defendant's wealth.96
91. See FDIC v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 854, 861 (10th Cir. 1997) ([Wlhether a
"punitive damage award violates the Federal Constitution is a question separate and
apart from Oklahoma state law."). When liability is based solely on federal law, only
BMW factors apply. See Kim v. Nash Finch Co., 123 F.3d 1046 (8th Cir. 1997) (action for
employment discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
92. See Parsons v. First Investors Corp., 122 F.3d 525 (8th Cir. 1997).
93. See Cates Constr., Inc. v. Talbot Partners, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997).
94. See Ace v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.3d 1241 (9th Cir. 1998).
95. Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 851 P.2d 1084, 1110 (Or. 1993) (Peterson, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
96. See Alan Howard Scheiner, Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the
Seventh Amendment, and the Politics of Jury Power, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 142, 163 (1991).
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The concern about nonspecific jury instructions appeared to
be a primary focus of Justice O'Connor's dissent in TXO when
she noted that "[a]rbitrariness, caprice, passion, bias, and even
malice can replace reasoned judgment and law as the basis for
jury decision-making."97 Justice O'Connor was concerned that
these influences would shape a jury's decision in the context of
punitive damages when "juries sometimes receive only vague
and amorphous guidance."98
The Wyoming Supreme Court expressed just this concern
when it recently reviewed Wyoming's punitive damage
procedure in light of the BMW guideposts. 99 After noting that
the United States Supreme Court's history with the punitive
damage issue was "somewhat tortured," the Wyoming court said
the change in emphasis contained in BMW permitted Justice
O'Connor to shift from her previous dissenting positions and join
the majority and concurring opinions of BMW. 100
The Wyoming court found the standards of review used by
the Wyoming courts totally subjective because the court had the
authority to set aside or reduce an award of punitive damages
on an ad hoc basis when the amount of the award shocked the
collective judicial conscience of the court. The basic premise of
Wyoming law had been that the amount of punitive damages
was largely in the discretion of the finder of fact. 1 1 Recognizing
BMW demands that a court articulate objective standards,
which can be communicated to the jury in the form of
instructions and against which the propriety of the punitive
damage award could be weighed during the process of judicial
review, the Wyoming court wisely required the jury to be
instructed on the objective criteria for awarding punitive
damages required by federal substantive due process. To not so
instruct the jury would "hazard litigants in our courts to future
reversal by the Supreme Court of the United States because of
the denial of due process of law resulting from application of our
current process."1 0 2
Similarly, the Model Punitive Damages Act (MPDA)
suggests that the jury be instructed on the factors to be properly
97. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 474 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
98. Id.
99. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Shirley, 958 P.2d 1040 (Wyo. 1998).
100. Id. at 1043.
101. See id. at 1045.
102. Id.
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considered in assessing punitive damages. 103 The nine factors
suggested by the MPDA are described in the Comments to the
MPDA as "relatively non-controversial." The MPDA suggestions
incorporate the BMW guideposts. If the trial judge is the fact-
finder, the MPDA recommends that the judge make findings
showing the basis for an award of punitive damages. 104
It is clear that the Haslip / TXO /Honda /BMW line of cases
require that the Green Oil/Haslip factors, BMW guideposts,
similar state standards, or a combination of comparable detailed
criteria that provide "reasonable constraints" on punitive
damage awards, be used to determine the level of punitive
damages.
A jury instruction that provides a strong measure of
meaningful constraint and limits the "[u]nlimited jury
discretion" that was a concern in Haslip and BMW will be the
first of two steps that ensure a punitive damage award is not
arbitrary and complies with substantive due process.
B. Judicial Review
Although the second and third Green Oil/Haslip factors
mandate separate trial and appellate review, some states do not
103. See MODEL PUNITIvE DAMAGES ACT § 7, 14 U.L.A. 56 (Supp. 1997). The jury is
instructed to consider any evidence that has been admitted regarding the following
factors:
(1) the nature of defendant's wrongful conduct and its effect on the claimant and
others;
(2) the amount of compensatory damages;
(3) any fines, penalties, damages, or restitution paid or to be paid by the defendant
arising from the wrongful conduct;
(4) the defendant's present and future financial condition and the effect of an
award on each condition;
(5) any profit or gain, obtained by the defendant through the wrongful conduct, in
excess of that likely to be divested by this and any other actions against the defendant
for compensatory damages or restitution;
(6) any adverse effect of the award on innocent persons;
(7) any remedial measures taken or not taken by the defendant since the wrongful
conduct;
(8) compliance or noncompliance with any applicable standard promulgated by a
governmental or other generally recognized agency or organization whose function it is
to establish standards; and
(9) any other aggravating or mitigating factors relevant to the amount of the
award.
104. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221 (1997) (requiring the trial judge, when acting
as a fact finder, to make findings of fact on each of the statutory factors when making a
punitive award). See also Section VII, infra.
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distinguish between trial court and appellate court review. 0 5
This distinction is important because of the unique opportunity
of the trial judge to view the witnesses' credibility and weigh the
proof. 0 6  Separate from any motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict and motions for a new trial, some
states require that the trial judge automatically review the
punitive damage award for excessiveness, or for excessiveness
and inadequacy. Florida 10 7 and Montana 08 require such a
review by the trial judge.
When the trial court reviews an award of punitive damages,
or when a motion for a new trial includes the claim that the
punitive damage award is excessive, the judge will be required
to consider a variety of factors. Foremost among the factors is
whether the verdict is the result of passion, prejudice or
improper influence that shocks the conscience of the court. 0 9
The primary inquiry is whether the verdict was against the
great weight of the evidence. When a punitive damage award is
challenged on the basis that it is so excessive that it violates due
process considerations, the court must apply a BMW guidepost
review.
One of the issues raised in BMW was a state court's
erroneous belief that by stating it "considered the Green
Oil/Haslip factors, or similar state standard," the court could
"bullet proof' a punitive damage award and conclusively
establish the definite and meaningful constraint on the fact
finder's discretion in awarding punitive damages. The Alabama
court took this position in BMW; despite consideration of the
Haslip /Green Oil factors the Alabama court's decision was
reversed.
As the concurring opinion pointed out in BMW, the state
court's application of the factors intended to constrain punitive
damage awards will lead to reversal if done "in a way that belies
that purpose."110 As the first judicial authority to review the
punitive damage award, the trial judge is under a substantial
105. See, e.g., Clay v. Ferrellgas, Inc., 838 P.2d 487, 492 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992), rev'd
on other grounds, 881 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1151 (1995).
106. See, e.g., Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d. 789, 804 (Utah 1991) ("[T]he
trial judge is present during all aspects of the trial and listens to and views all witnesses.
Therefore, he or she can best determine if the jury acted with 'passion or prejudice' and
whether the award was too small or too large in light of the evidence.").
107. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.74(1) (West 1997).
108. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7)(c) (1997).
109. See, e.g., Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 456, 466 (Idaho 1996).
110. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 589 (1996).
394 Vol. 60
28
Montana Law Review, Vol. 60 [1999], Iss. 2, Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/3
PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS
duty to conduct a meaningful review that does not rely on mere
formal recitation of the statutory criteria or abdicate the duty of
independent review by slavishly adhering to jury conclusions
about the proper level of punitive damages.
The usual review procedure requires the trial judge to first
determine if the punitive damage award bears a reasonable
relationship to the goals of punishment and deterrence.
Thereafter, the trial judge must determine whether the sum
awarded is within proper bounds."' It is critical for the trial
judge to articulate the reasons for modifying or confirming the
jury verdict, providing the appellate court with a reflective
second look at the trial evidence. The unique opportunity of the
trial judge to view witness credibility and weigh the proof gives
substantial weight to the trial judge's review.
When the appellate court considers a challenge to a punitive
damage award on the basis of excessiveness, its analysis should
also consider the award under both state standards and
constitutional standards as articulated in BMW. If the appellate
court determines that the award is excessive, it may vacate the
award and remand for a new trial on the issue of damages only
or modify the award without remanding for a new trial.112
VII. PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN MONTANA
A. Statutory Procedure
Montana substantially rewrote its punitive damage law,
both procedurally and substantively, in 1987. Montana requires
a bifurcated trial. Compensatory damages and liability for
punitive damages are determined separately. At the
compensatory damage phase, the court does not instruct the jury
on the appropriate level of punitive damages. After the jury
returns a verdict that the defendant is liable for punitive
damages, an immediate separate proceeding commences and the
same jury hears evidence relevant to the level of punitive
damages. At the punitive damage phase, the statute's only
requirement is that the jury consider the defendant's financial
111. The analysis may be made in a two step process or the two steps may be
combined into a unitary review. See, e.g., Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350, 354
(S.C. 1991).
112. See Cates Constr., Inc. v. Talbot Partners, 62 Cal. Rptr. 2d 548 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997).
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affairs, financial condition, and net worth.113
B. Statutory Criteria for Trial Court Review of Punitive Damage
Award
Although the Montana statute does not require that the
jury be instructed on the statutory criteria, the trial judge's
review of the jury award of punitive damages must demonstrate
consideration of each of the following criteria:
(1) The nature and reprehensibility of the defendant's
wrongdoing;
(2) The extent of the defendant's wrongdoing;
(3) The intent of the defendant in committing the wrong;
(4) The profitability of the defendant's wrongdoing, if applicable;
(5) The amount of actual damages awarded by the jury;
(6) The defendant's net worth;
(7) Previous awards of punitive or exemplary damages against
the defendant based upon the same wrongful act;
(8) Potential or prior criminal sanctions against the defendant
based upon the same wrongful act; and
(9) Any other circumstances that may operate to increase or
reduce, without wholly defeating, punitive damages. 114
C. Instructions
Montana's punitive damage cases decided after BMW do not
reveal what instructions were given the juries to assist in
assessing the amount of the punitive damage award. Local
practice suggests using the Montana Pattern Jury Instruction
(MPJI) on punitive damages developed by the Montana Supreme
Court Commission on Civil Jury Instructions. MPJI 25.65 is
customarily given to assist the jury in determining the amount
of punitive damages. MPJI 25.65 reads as follows:
In determining the amount of punitive damages, you should
consider all of the attending circumstances, including the nature,
extent and enormity of the wrong, the intent of the party
committing it, the amount allowed as actual damages and,
generally, all of the circumstances which may operate to reduce
113. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7)(a) (1997).
114. See id. § 27-1-221(7)(b).
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without wholly defeating punitive damages.
Punitive damages should be of such an amount as will deter the
defendant from, and warn others against similar acts of
misconduct. Thus, the wealth of the defendant is a fact to be
considered by you in determining the amount of punitive
damages.115
MPJI 25.65 falls short of providing much helpful, and
required, guidance for the assessment of punitive damages. It
does not:
(1) Expressly limit the jury to consideration of
the defendant's in-state actions, an express
due process limitation, 116
(2) Advise the jury to consider the profitability of
the defendant's wrongdoing, although this is a
specific statutory factor required by Montana
Code Annotated § 27-1-221,
(3) Distinguish between the defendant's "wealth"
and the statutory criteria requiring
consideration of the defendant's "new
worth",117
(4) Advise the jury to consider many of the
Haslip/Green Oil "definite and meaningful
constraint" criteria-the harm likely to occur
as well as the harm that actually occurred,
the defendant's awareness of the wrongful
nature of the act, the defendant's concealment
of the wrongful act, the existence and
frequency of similar past conduct, the
desirability of removing the defendant's profit
from the wrongful conduct and also the
desirability of having the defendant sustain a
loss, the cost of litigation, the imposition of
criminal or civil sanctions against the
115. Montana Pattern Jury Instruction 25.65.
116. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).
117. The difference between "new worth," a technical accounting term generally
computed as the amount by which assets exceed liabilities, and "wealth," a general
concept which includes possessions, assets, and all material objects having a value, has
the potential to create the argument that consideration of the defendant's "wealth"
exceeds the statutory standard of "net worth." See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1041, 1593
(6th ed. 1990).
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defendant and the existence of other civil
awards against the defendant for the same
conduct (both the sanctions and civil awards
to be taken in mitigation).
D. Judicial Review
Montana provides by statute that after the jury has
determined the amount of punitive damages, the trial judge
must automatically review the punitive damage award based on
specified statutory criteria. Following that review, the trial
judge may increase, decrease, or affirm the jury's verdict. In
reviewing the punitive damage award, the district judge has
broad discretion but that discretion is not unlimited. The
decision of the trial judge to increase, decrease, or affirm the
jury verdict must be supported by a clear statement of the
reasons for taking such action. The statement of reasons shall
be in the form of findings of fact and conclusions of law, and
shall demonstrate consideration of each of the nine factors
defined by statute. If the trial judge decides to increase or
decrease the jury verdict his or her decision must be supported
by the statutory criteria and by findings of fact which are
themselves supported by substantial evidence and not
inconsistent with findings implicit in the jury's verdict. 118 The
judge is bound by the jury's determination of facts on all issues
that have been presented to the jury. The review by the trial
court does not open the door for reversal of jury findings on
underlying issues of liability.119
If a punitive damage award is appealed, the Montana
Supreme Court reviews the district court's findings regarding
the amount awarded. The court uses a three-part test to
determine if the district court findings are clearly erroneous.
First, the court reviews the record to see if the findings are
supported by substantial evidence. Second, if the findings are
supported by substantial evidence, the court determines if the
trial court misapprehended the effect of the evidence. Third, if
substantial evidence exists and the effect of the evidence has not
been misapprehended, the court may still determine that a
finding is clearly erroneous when, although evidence supports
the finding, review of the record leaves the court with the
118. See DeBruycker v. Guarantee Nat'l Ins. Co., 266 Mont. 294, 300, 880 P.2d 819,
822 (1994).
119. See id. at 300, 880 P.2d at 822.
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definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. 120
In conducting its review of the trial judge's findings, the
court has not set a specific level of detail needed to demonstrate
consideration of the statutory criteria. Awards have been
affirmed by a statement that since "[tihe district court
considered the factors in 27-1-221(7)(b), MCA, and concluded
that ... was an appropriate amount for punitive damages... we
will not disturb their decision."12' At the other end of the
spectrum, the court has detailed the extensive findings made by
the trial court and thereafter concluded that, with the exception
of one finding not supported by the evidence, the remaining
findings were supported by substantial, credible evidence and
not clearly erroneous. 22 The court has also held that the trial
court's function is not to simply engage in a mathematical
calculation to determine whether the majority of factors favor
one disposition or the other. Under any given set of
circumstances, one factor may be weighted more heavily than
others. For example, when a defendant's net worth has been
established and simply precludes a substantial damage award,
that factor may merit primary consideration. In such
circumstances, the district judge must articulate why one factor
weighs more heavily than others to support altering the jury's
punitive damage award. 23
Nineteen months after BMW was decided, the Montana
Supreme Court was presented with an excellent opportunity to
consider the BMW guideposts and how they might impact
Montana's statutory criteria for reviewing punitive damages. 124
Unfortunately, the Montana Supreme Court declined to apply
either the BMW guideposts or acknowledge the existence of a
U.S. Supreme Court decision making the level of a punitive
damage award an issue of federal substantive law.
E. Montana's Neighboring States
Montana's neighboring states have all incorporated the
BMW guideposts in recent decisions. With the exception of
120. See Interstate Prod. Credit Ass'n v. DeSaye, 250 Mont. 320, 322, 820 P.2d
1285, 1286 (1991).
121. Rocky Mountain Enters., Inc. v. Pierce Flooring, 286 Mont. 282, 296, 951 P.2d
1326, 1335 (1997).
122. See Cartwright v. Equitable Life Assurance, 276 Mont. 1, 43, 914 P.2d 976,
1002 (1996).
123. See id. at 44, 914 P.2d at 1002.
124. See Rocky Mountain Enters., Inc., at 287, 951 P.2d at 1329.
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Wyoming, it appears that the BMW guideposts have not caused
significant modifications of existing punitive damage criteria.
North Dakota made only a passing reference to the BMW
holding when ruling that the sum awarded did not violate the
BMW prohibition against a punitive damage award based on
conduct lawful in another jurisdiction. 125 Shortly after the BMW
decision, the South Dakota Supreme Court held that excessive
punitive damages are now firmly held to carry constitutional
implications. 126 The South Dakota court has skillfully integrated
several of the BMW guideposts into the five criteria that South
Dakota uses to assess the reasonableness of a punitive award.
Idaho, in a case decided just after BMW, recognized its notice
requirements and the absence of a fixed upper limit on the ratio
of compensatory to punitive damages. 127 The Idaho court
deferred to the trial judge's ruling that articulated a sound basis
for the punitive damage award and held that no constitutional
limitation had been violated.
The Wyoming Supreme Court took a hard look at its
punitive damages procedure and found it lacking. 128 Although
finding that Wyoming precedent fits with the three guideposts of
BMW, the court concluded that the instructions given to the jury
were inadequate and should have included more specificity in
accord with those adopted in BMW from Haslip. The Wyoming
court held that the jury should be instructed on all seven of the
Green Oil/Haslip factors and that failure to do so justified
remand for a new trial.
VIII. TRIAL JUDGE'S PUNITIVE DAMAGE/DuE PROCESS DUTIES
The fractured decision of BMW makes it difficult to predict
future federal due process requirements. What does seem clear,
from the BMW concurring opinion, academic commentary, and
subsequent lower court decisions, is that the next due process
requirement likely to be required by the Supreme Court will be
a jury instruction on factors that promote "reasonable
constraints" and judicial review which is comprehensive and the
product of the exercise of the judge's independent judicial
discretion. As the Supreme Court stated in TXO, and reiterated
125. See Ingalls v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Group, 561 N.W.2d 273, 286 (N.D. 1997).
126. See Grynberg v. Citation Oil & Gas, 573 N.W.2d 493 (S.D. 1997); Veeder v.
Kennedy, 589 N.W.2d 610 (S.D. 1999).
127. See Walston v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 923 P.2d 456, 468 (Idaho 1996).
128. See Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Shirley, 958 P.2d 1040 (Wyo. 1998).
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in BMW's concurring opinion, if "fair procedures were followed, a
judgment that is a product of that process is entitled to a strong
presumption of validity."129
The trial judge owes a duty to the parties and their counsel
to provide fair and competent trial leadership that ensures the
punitive damage award is appropriate to the circumstances of
the case. Possessing a familiarity with the due process history
of punitive damages, and armed with the Green Oil/Haslip
factors, BMW's guideposts, Model Punitive Damage Act
suggestions, and state standards, the trial judge will be well
equipped to properly instruct the jury and conduct the trial
court review of the jury award of punitive damages.
A. Instructions
Long before the jury decides that punitive damages should
be awarded, the trial judge must begin planning to instruct the
jury on its task of setting the level of punitive damages. 130
Comprehensive jury instructions can guide the judge's rulings
on objections to damage evidence and diminish challenges to the
trial judge's review of the punitive damage award.
When jury instructions omit statutory or due process
criteria, several problems present themselves to the trial judge.
In the absence of explicit criteria, the trial judge must decide
what evidence will be presented to the jury for their
consideration in setting the level of punitive damages.
Generally, the instructions will set the parameters for the
admission of evidence but when the instructions do not include
all of the statutory criteria, argument inevitably arises over
whether the jury should hear evidence not covered in the
instructions. An instruction that contains all of the relevant
statutory criteria, not unduly prejudicial, clearly informs the
trial judge and counsel of the limits on the admission of punitive
damage evidence.
129. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993); BMW of N.
Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 586-87 (1996).
130. Discovery requests for the defendant's financial information will generally be
the first damage related issues presented to the trial judge. See FULL DIscOVERY:
COMBATING STONEWALLING AND OTHER DISCOVERY ABUSES app. 1 (2d ed. 1995). See
also Delgado v. Kitzman, (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), 793 S.W.2d 332 (allowing discovery of
defendant's net worth); Miller v. Doctor's Gen. Hosp., 76 F.R.D. 136, 140 (W.D. Okla.
1977) (holding where punitive damages are claimed, defendant's financial condition is
proper subject of discovery); City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981)
(finding information concerning defendant's financial condition relevant and
discoverable on a claim of punitive damages).
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The trial judge must be aware that if the instructions tell
the jury to consider certain evidence, but fail to mention other
evidence presented to the jury, this omission raises the issue
that the instructions unduly emphasized certain aspects of the
evidence and are a prohibited judicial comment on the evidence.
An instruction that briefly mentions all of the factors that may
be properly considered by the jury would cure this potential
problem.
It can be argued that catch-all criteria, such as Montana's
"any other circumstances. . .," would allow consideration of
evidence not specifically enumerated in a criteria-based
instruction. 131 The problem with that approach is that it causes
exactly the problem presented in Dees, where the plaintiff
wanted to prove cost of litigation (a Green Oil/Haslip factor) to
show intent, malice and bullying by American National of its
insured. The Montana Supreme Court said such proof was not
required under Montana's statutory criteria and anyway, the
jury is permitted to hear any other evidence under the "any
other circumstances" criteria. Unfortunately for the plaintiff,
the trial judge had not allowed evidence on the cost of litigation
so this factor was not considered by the jury or the trial judge.
In her dissent in Haslip, Justice O'Connor was adamant
that the Green Oil/Haslip factors "could assist juries to make
fair, rational decisions."' 32 Justice Scalia, in his dissent in BMW,
made the telling point that, although he disagreed with the
majority position that each assessment of punitive damages
must be examined to determine the precise "state interest," if
those interests are "the most fundamental determinant of an
award, one would think that due process would require the
assessing jury to be instructed about them."33
Given the problems associated with not fully instructing the
jury on the statutory criteria for awarding and assessing
punitive damages, it is valuable to examine just why the
Wyoming Supreme Court, in its analysis of BMW, felt it
necessary to conclude that:
The [U.S. Supreme] court not only has articulated a demand for
objective standards as distinguished from subjective standards for
awarding punitive damages, but it has signaled a future
requirement that for due process to be present those objective
131. See Dees v. American Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 260 Mont. 431, 449, 861 P.2d 141, 152
(1993).
132. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 51 (1991).
133. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 602 (1996).
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standards should be given to the jury in the form of instructions.
If the objective standards are not communicated to the jury, then
the invocation of such standards only for the purposes of review
would infringe upon the right of the parties to a jury trial. 3 4
With the caveat that the judge must withhold certain
evidence from jury consideration due to its extremely prejudicial
effect (such as information about punitive to compensatory
ratios), this author recommends that the trial judge invite
counsel to propose jury instructions that give complete
consideration of the Green OilIHaslip factors, BMW guideposts,
Model Punitive Damages Act suggestions, and state standards.
Proposed jury instructions that fairly address substantive due
process issues, if received in advance of the damage portion of
the trial, guide the trial judge in ruling on the admissibility of
evidence. 135 Included in this article as Appendix A is a summary
of the Green Oil/Haslip factors, BMW guideposts, and Model
Punitive Damages Act suggestions. Appendix A will be of
assistance in reviewing proposed punitive damage instructions.
When settling punitive damage instructions, the judge may
begin with state standards, incorporate the Green Oil/Haslip
factors not included in the state standards, and conclude with
any suggestions contained in the Model Punitive Damages Act
(MPDA) that may bear on the fact situation. For example, the
MPDA suggests consideration of the adverse effect of the award
on innocent persons or any remedial measures taken or not
taken since the wrongful conduct. 136 If warranted by the facts of
the case, the MPDA suggestions can be valuable constraints on
jury awards.
In light of the shortcomings of Montana Pattern Jury
Instruction 25.65 noted above, this author suggests that the
revised instruction included as Appendix B would encompass all
of the statutory criteria to be considered by the trial judge in
134. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Shirley, 958 P.2d 1040, 1043-44 (Wyo. 1998).
135. See FED. R. CiV. P. 51. Many state rules of civil procedure are modeled after
the federal rule, which provides:
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time during the trial as the court
reasonably directs, any party may file written requests that the court instruct
the jury on the law as set forth in the requests.
See also MoNT. R. CIV. P. 51, providing that "the court may, during the trial or at the
close of the evidence, request each of the parties to submit proposed written instructions
on the law of the case."
136. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 565-66 (noting that before the judgment against BMW in
Alabama, BMW changed its policy regarding the sale of refinished vehicles in Alabama
and two other states).
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reviewing the punitive damage award, as well as the Green
Oil/Haslip factors, BMW guideposts, and MPDA suggestions.
Those portions of the instruction not raised by the evidence
should be deleted.
B. Trial Court Review of Punitive Damage Awards
The trial judge's findings need to be detailed and
comprehensive; they need to reflect any special circumstance
that may not be apparent from the record. The detail needed in
the trial judge's findings is well illustrated in Parsons v. First
Investors Corp.137 While applying Missouri's factors, the trial
judge found that the Parsons were "an elderly retired couple of
good standing in the community, but with limited education and
investment experience. The defendant was experienced in
selling financial investments." Further, the trial court found
that First Investors "intended to take advantage of
unsophisticated investors." The trial court concluded that
"[fraudulent representations which put the life savings of the
elderly at risk are reprehensible and deserve punishment."
Findings that show the appellate court what the record does
not reveal can be very persuasive and enable the appellate court
to have confidence that the trial judge's review merits approval:
The reasonableness of the verdict was challenged before the trial
judge and he reduced it. The fact he heard the evidence and was
more familiar than we with the evidentiary atmosphere at trial
gives him, we think, a better informed view than we have. This is
particularly true when the elements of damage are intangibles
and the appraisal depends somewhat on an observation of the
[witnesses] and evaluation of their testimony. 138
The reviewing trial judge should make findings on each of
the factors upon which the jury received instruction. The
reviewing trial judge should recall that the jury has not been
instructed on all of the factors and criteria that must be
considered by the reviewing court. For example, the five-part
hierarchy of reprehensibility from BMW Guidepost I and ratios
from similar and dissimilar cases may not have been presented
to the jury. When evaluating punitive damages, a trial judge
would be well advised to begin with detailed findings on each
state standard and then address federal due process
137. 122 F.3d 525 (8th Cir. 1997).
138. Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350, 354 (S. C. 1991).
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considerations. When the judge evaluates a punitive damage
award in accordance with state standards, in most cases the
BMW guideposts will be fully addressed. For example,
consideration of South Carolina's first criteria (defendant's
degree of culpability) has been found to fully address the BMW
guidepost of degree of reprehensibility. 139
Also of considerable value to the trial judge reviewing the
punitive damage award is articulate consideration of the
hierarchy of reprehensibility discussed in BMW Guidepost I.
The Court specifically mentioned the "more reprehensible/less
reprehensible" comparison of:
(1) violent vs. nonviolent,
(2) intentional trickery and deceit vs. negligence,
(3) physical harm vs. economic harm,
(4) repeated acts knowing it was unlawful vs. one instance of
malfeasance, and
(5) deliberate false statement vs. omission of material fact.140
In addition, the Court noted that "infliction of economic
injury, especially when done intentionally through affirmative
acts of misconduct, or when the target is financially vulnerable,
can warrant a substantial penalty."141
When the trial judge considers BMW Guidepost II-ratio of
punitive damages to compensatory damages-it is helpful for
the trial judge to develop a field of reference to punitive damage
awards in similar cases so the punitive award in the instant
case is not considered in a vacuum. BMW reiterated that the
constitutional line is not marked by a simple mathematical
formula or bright line. However, a range of ratios has developed
after BMW; federal courts set the permissible ratio at 5 to 1 and
state courts set the ratio as high as 30 to 1.142
The trial judge considering punitive to compensatory ratios
needs to be aware that reported cases may not reflect the
universe of punitive damage awards. A study was conducted in
mid-1997 to determine how courts have handled punitive
damages after the BMW decision. 143 The study analyzed both
139. See Lister v. NationsBank, 494 S.E.2d 449, 458 (S. C. 1997).
140. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 575-79.
141. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 576.
142. See Thumma, supra note 83.
143. See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Punitive Awards After BMW, a
New Capping System, and the Reported Opinion Bias, 1998 WiS. L. REV. 387.
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state and federal court decisions. The authors concluded that the
reported cases were systemically biased upwards when
compared to the larger number of cases reported in the Civil
Trial Court Network (CTCN) reporting system for state courts
from forty-five of the country's largest urban counties. The
authors determined that:
[A]n observer who sees only reported opinions will therefore have
a different impression of the pattern of punitive awards than an
omniscient observer.144
The difference between the mass of cases decided in state trial
courts and the highly filtered set of cases that lead to reported
opinions has important implications for judicial review of the ratio
of punitive to compensatory awards, either pre- or post-BMW.
Courts reviewing punitive awards often try to assess such awards
by comparing them with prior decisions.145 ... [Clomparing
punitive-compensatory ratios with the biased sample of reported
opinions dramatically elevates the ratios that appear to have been
approved in the past. This could lead courts that rely on past
reported decisions to assess punitive-compensatory ratios to
approve ratios that are higher than the actual mass of punitive-
compensatory ratios, as represented by the CTCN data 146
The post-BMW set of awards, though driven downward by a
change in law that imposed constitutional limits on punitive
damages for the first time, is uniformly higher than the set of
awards in the mass of tried cases predating BMW. 147
A judge looking at the mass of trial awards observes a median
punitive-compensatory ratio of about 1.3 to 1. A judge looking
only at awards in reported opinions observes a median ratio five to
ten times higher.148
This research suggests that the trial judge should exercise
caution when looking at punitive damage awards in reported
opinions.
BMW's Guidepost III is intended to give the defendant fair
notice of what the state believes is appropriate punishment for
the prohibited conduct. BMW also gives notice to the defendant
by judicial decision, in any arena, that the prohibited conduct
could give rise to severe punishment. 149 Presumably, notice
144. Id. at 409.
145. Id. at 414.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 415.
148. Id. at 415-16.
149. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 584 (1996).
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would include other large punitive damage awards for similar
conduct by others. The judge can be fairly certain that a
punitive damage award less than statutory penalties, such as
triple damages, will clearly fall within the permitted range.
Less certain is how to translate a potential criminal
sanction into a money judgment. Corporate officers may be
willing to pay a very large sum to avoid prison. The judge needs
to adjust for the higher standard of proof for criminal sanctions
which may serve to reduce the likelihood of conviction. The
judge's articulation of his or her reasoning and balancing is
invaluable to the support of the ultimate conclusion.
When the Montana trial judge reviews a punitive damage
award, the first step is consideration of Montana's statutory
criteria. As suggested earlier, keeping the BMW guideposts in
mind enables the trial court to consider most of the guideposts
during its review of state standards.
Thereafter, the judge needs to consider the BMW guideposts
not coextensive with Montana's statutory criteria to comply with
due process. The judge should consider the hierarchy of
reprehensibility noted above and relate it to the jury verdict.
The trial judge must consider whether the jury improperly
considered the defendant's actions in another state,150 and the
ratio of punitive damages to the compensatory award and the
criminal penalties that could be imposed for comparative
conduct. The trial court must give substantial deference to
Montana law which sets maximum fines for certain prohibited
conduct because the legislature has implicitly stated its view on
the size of monetary penalties it deems sufficient to achieve both
punishment and deterrence.
The court can also consider punitive damage awards in
similar cases, even in other jurisdictions. The point made by
BMW is that such awards place the defendant on notice of
possible sanctions for misconduct.
Finally, given that the Green Oil/Haslip factors are still a
valid constraint when properly applied, the Montana trial judge
would be well advised to comment on the following factors if
raised by the evidence:
(1) The reasonableness of the relationship between the punitive
150. See BMW, 517 U.S. at 573 n.21 (noting it was error to use such evidence as a
multiplier of damages, but "such evidence is relevant to the determination of the degree
of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct"). If this evidence is present, a cautionary
instruction limiting such conduct to reprehensibility is appropriate.
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award and the harm likely to occur;
(2) Duration of the defendant's wrongdoing;
(3) Defendant's awareness or concealment of his wrongdoing;
(4) Existence and frequency of similar past conduct; and
(5) All costs of litigation. 151
IX. Summary
Commenting on the duty of the trial judge to review a jury's
punitive damage award, the Supreme Court of New Mexico said
that:
[Time and time again our appellate courts have come to the
conclusion that the best way to arrive at a reasonable award of
damages is for the trial judge and the jury to work together, each
diligently performing its respective duty to arrive at a decision
that is as fair as humanly possible under the facts and
circumstances of a given case."152
In the aftermath of BMW, the trial judge is faced with the
difficult task of properly conducting the damage portion of a
punitive damage trial. Where the judge's actions are potentially
subject to scrutiny by the same U.S. Supreme Court that said a
punitive to compensatory damage ratio of 4 to 1 comes "close to
the line," then approved a 526 to 1 ratio, then reversed a 500 to
1 ratio, even the most seasoned judge may experience number
numbness. When we overlay this federal due process
uncertainty with state standards for reviewing punitive
damages and jury instructions that are vague and laden with
reversal potential, we see that the punitive damage trial judge
needs to carefully manage the admission of evidence, jury
instructions, and trial court review of punitive damage awards.
Keeping in mind basic knowledge of punitive damage history, an
abbreviated statement of the Green Oil/Haslip factors, the
BMW guideposts, the MPDA suggestions, and the judge's state
standards enables the judge to plot a course through the
punitive damage thicket. Above all, the trial judge must
conduct a comprehensive and independent review of the punitive
damage award. In doing so, the trial judge gives the punitive
damage award the coveted "strong presumption of validity"
151. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
152. See Alsup's Convenience Stores, Inc. v. North River Ins. Co., 976 P.2d, 1, 8
(N.M. 1998).
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required by Haslip. No one wants to try the case again.
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APPENDIX A
GREEN OIL/HASLIP FACTORS, BMW GUIDEPOSTS &
MPDA SUGGESTIONS
Green Oil/Haslip Factors:
(1) Whether there is a reasonable relationship
between the punitive damages award and the
harm likely to result from the defendant's conduct
as well as the harm that actually has occurred;
(2) The degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's
conduct, the duration of that conduct, the
defendant's awareness, any concealment, and the
existence and frequency of similar past conduct;
(3) The profitability to the defendant of the wrongful
conduct and the desirability of removing that
profit and having the defendant also sustain a
loss;
(4) The "financial position" of the defendant;
(5) All the costs of litigation;
(6) The imposition of criminal sanctions on the
defendant for its conduct, these to be taken in
mitigation; and
(7) The existence of other civil awards against the
defendant for the same conduct, these also to be
taken in mitigation.
BMW Guideposts:
Guidepost I: Degree of reprehensibility-The degree of
reprehensibility is the most important indicium of the
reasonableness of punitive damages. A suggested hierarchy of
reprehensible conduct is:
(1) Nonviolent crimes are less serious than crimes
marked by violence or the threat of violence,
Vol. 60410
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(2) Intentional trickery and deceit are more
reprehensible than negligence,
(3) Economic harm is less reprehensible than physical
harm,
(4) Repeated acts of prohibited conduct while
knowing or suspecting that it was unlawful are
more reprehensible than one instance of
malfeasance, and
(5) The omission of a material fact is less
reprehensible than deliberately making a false
statement. This is particularly true when there is
a good-faith basis for believing that no duty to
disclose exists.
Guidepost II: Ratio of punitive damage award to
compensatory award-Exemplary damages must bear a
"reasonable relationship" to compensatory damages, but a
constitutional line cannot be marked by a simple mathematical
formula. The size of the award can be one indication that the
punitive damage award resulted from bias, passion or prejudice.
However, it is not the sole or the most important sign.
The punitive damage award should consider not only the
harm actually done but the harm likely to result from the
defendant's conduct. The size, small or large, of the
compensatory damage award could support a large punitive
damage award; it is entirely dependant on the nature of the
facts of the case. A higher ratio may be justified in cases in
which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary value of non-
economic harm might have been difficult to determine.
Guidepost III: Sanctions for comparable misconduct-
Consideration of the civil or criminal penalties that could be
imposed for comparable misconduct accords substantial
deference to state legislatures who have established maximum
fines for certain prohibited conduct.
Model Punitive Damages Act:
The jury is instructed to consider any evidence that has
been admitted regarding the following factors:
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(1) The nature of defendant's wrongful conduct and
its effect on the claimant and others;
(2) The amount of compensatory damages;
(3) Any fines, penalties, damages, or restitution paid
or to be paid by the defendant arising from the
wrongful conduct;
(4) The defendant's present and future financial
condition and the effect of an award on each
condition;
(5) Any profit or gain, obtained by the defendant
through the wrongful conduct, in excess of that
likely to be divested by this and any other actions
against the defendant for compensatory damages
or restitution;
(6) Any adverse effect of the award on innocent
persons;
(7) Any remedial measures taken or not taken by the
defendant since the wrongful conduct;
(8) Compliance or noncompliance with any applicable
standard promulgated by governmental or other
generally recognized agency or organization whose
function it is to establish standards; and
(9) Any other aggravating or mitigating factors
relevant to the amount of the award.
Vol. 60412
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APPENDIX B
REVISED MONTANA PUNITIVE DAMAGE INSTRUCTION
INSTRUCTION NO.
Punitive damages should be of such an amount as will deter
the defendant from and warn others against similar acts of
misconduct.
In determining punitive damages, you should consider each
of the following matters:
(1) The nature and reprehensibility of the defendant's
wrongdoing. The degree of reprehensibility of the
defendant's conduct should be considered. The
duration of this conduct, the degree of the
defendant's awareness of any hazard which his
conduct has caused or is likely to cause, and any
concealment or "cover-up" of that hazard, and the
existence and frequency of similar past conduct
should all be relevant in determining this degree
of reprehensibility.
(2) The extent of the defendant's wrongdoing.
(3) The intent of the defendant in committing the
wrong.
(4) If the wrongful conduct was profitable to the
defendant, the punitive damages should remove
the profit and should be in excess of the profit, so
that the defendant recognizes a loss.
(5) The amount of actual damages awarded by the
jury. Punitive damages should bear a reasonable
relationship to the harm that is likely to occur
from the defendant's conduct as well as to the
harm that actually has occurred. If the actual or
likely harm is slight, the damages should be
relatively small. If grievous, the damages should
be much greater.
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(6) The defendant's net worth.
(7) If there have been other civil judgments against
the same defendant, based on the same conduct,
this should be taken into account in mitigation of
the punitive damages award.
(8) Potential or prior criminal sanctions against the
defendant based upon the same wrongful act
should be taken into account in mitigation of the
punitive damages award.
(9) All the costs of litigation should be included, so as
to encourage plaintiffs to bring wrongdoers to
trial.
(10) A higher ratio of punitive damages to
compensatory damages is justified in cases in
which the injury is hard to detect or the monetary
value of non-economic harm might be difficult to
determine.
(11) Any adverse effect of the award on innocent
persons.
(12) Any remedial measures taken or not taken by the
defendant since the wrongful conduct.
(13) Compliance or noncompliance with any applicable
standard promulgated by a governmental or other
generally recognized agency or organization whose
function it is to establish standards.
(14) Any other circumstances that may operate to
increase or reduce, without wholly defeating,
punitive damages.
GIVEN:
Vol. 60414
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